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A SHOT ACROSS THE BOW:
CHANGING THE PARADIGM OF FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT REVIEW IN THE
UNITED STATES
I. INTRODUCTION

W

hat do voting machines and ports have in common? Surprisingly, both may implicate vital national security considerations. 1
In 2006, congressional concerns and public outcry precipitated investigations into the foreign ownership of ports and voting machines, a little
anticipated consequence of increased concerns about national security
following the events of September 11, 2001 that will test American
commitment to its historic policy of open borders in foreign investment. 2
In March 2006, the proposed acquisition of a British company, Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. (P&O), by Dubai Ports World
(DPW), a company owned by the government of Dubai in the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), brought a little known inter-agency committee,
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), to
the “intersection of the global economy and the war on terrorism.” 3 Under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, CFIUS reviews proposed foreign direct investment (FDI) within the framework of U.S. open
investment policy, providing the President with a basis to restrict FDI
where necessary to protect national security. 4 Following the World Trade
1. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller et al., Threats and Responses: The Reaction; Panel
Saw No Security Issue In Port Contract, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at A1;
Tim Golden, U.S. Investigates Voting Machines’ Venezuela Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2006, at A11.
2. The acquisition of a British company involved in producing U.S. military aircraft
and tanks by Dubai International Capital, a company based in the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), failed to elicit similar concerns. Robert McMahon, The Chill After the Ports
Storm, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, May 23, 2006, www.cfr.org/publication
/10755/chill_after_the_ports_storm.html.
3. Bill Spindle et al., In Ports Furor, a Clash over Dubai, WALL ST. J. Feb. 23,
2006, at A1. Shoe-bomber Richard Reid was a British citizen, yet no objections were
raised that a British company operated U.S. ports. Eben Kaplan, The UAE Purchase of
American Port Facilities, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Feb. 21, 2006,
www.cfr.org/publication9918/uae_purchase_of_american_port_facilities.htm [hereinafter
Kaplan, UAE Purchase].
4. The President’s authority to investigate the effects on national security of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers is limited to those that “could result in foreign control of
persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.” 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170.
See, e.g., Bumiller et al., supra note 1.
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Center attacks of September 11, 2001, investigations revealed the vulnerability of domestic infrastructure like airports, bridges, and ports to
terrorist attack. 5 The acquisition of P&O would have given DPW, and
through it, the government of Dubai, ownership of port leases at six major U.S. cities. 6 A media furor ensued, highlighting the concern that foreign ownership of domestic infrastructure itself represented a national
security concern. Over twenty bills were introduced in Congress to address the threat to national security represented by direct foreign investment in the United States. 7 Two separate bills passed in the House and
Senate respectively contain the framework for reform of the current regulatory regime, which centers power of review in CFIUS. 8
CFIUS emerged more recently in the context of a controversy regarding foreign ownership of Smartmatic, a leading manufacturer of U.S.
electronic voting machines. In this case, CFIUS reviewed the 2005 acquisition of Sequoia Voting Systems, a Californian company, by Smartmatic, a privately held Venezuelan company. 9 The swathe of business
interests implicated in a foreign investment review process that sweeps
both ports and voting machines into its purview elicits questions as to
what we are trying to protect, and from whom.
This Note argues that the current regulatory scheme is preferable to the
proposed legislative reform because the existing regime has been successful in maintaining the primacy of traditional U.S. open investment
policy without compromising national security. The DPW and Smartmatic deals nonetheless reveal a central problem with the existing paradigm: the lack of public and congressional confidence that CFIUS has
conducted an effective review. Three central issues emerge from this
common problem. First, congressional oversight is required to ensure
CFIUS abides by its implementing legislation. Second, enhanced congressional oversight may be necessary to protect transactions from un5. See generally OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
HOMELAND SECURITY (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_
hls.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY].
6. Audrey Hudson, Foreign Ownership of U.S. Terminals Remains Unknown,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at A9.
7. ALAN P. LARSON & DAVID M. MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL
SECURITY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORT No. 18, 25 (2006)
[hereinafter LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT]; Greg Simmons, Foreign Investment Still a Concern for Congress, FOX NEWS, May 4, 2006, http://www.fox
news.com/story/0,2933,194186,00.html.
8. National Security Foreign Investment Reform and Strengthened Transparency
Act, H.R. 5337, 109th Cong. (2006); Foreign Investment and National Security Act, S.
3549, 109th Cong. (2006).
9. Golden, supra note 1.
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necessary political and public controversy. Third, although the CFIUS
review process proceeds ad hoc, its reviews of specific transactions
nonetheless reveal larger security vulnerabilities. Enhanced congressional oversight, properly delimited, could provide the opportunity to
draft tailored legislation to meet the security risks thus exposed while
allowing individual transactions to proceed. While the proposed legislative reform, to some extent, might accomplish these objectives, it does so
at the risk of deterring foreign investment while rendering CFIUS less
effective. Instead, to ensure that the United States continues to benefit
from FDI, congressional oversight must be limited to the extent necessary to address these problems.
Prefatory to the analysis of the existing and proposed legislation, Part
II of this Note reviews the interrelation between foreign investment policy and national security, and in Part III, the facts and circumstances of
the DPW and Smartmatic transactions. Part IV articulates two different
models for the regulation of FDI, using the existing and proposed legislation as examples. The analysis demonstrates that the existing paradigm
provides a better result by favoring open investment over national security concerns and reveals, through application of the proposed paradigm
to the facts of the DPW and Smartmatic transactions, that the proposed
paradigm sacrifices open investment policy with little tangible security
benefit. Part V identifies the key problems with the existing paradigm
that emerge from this analysis, and proposes an alternative strategy more
consistent with the traditional open investment policy of the United
States while taking into account the evolving challenges of national security.
II. COMPETING VALUES: OPEN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY
U.S. economic policy traditionally emphasizes the importance of open
investment; in fact, much of the United States’ current preeminence and
past development may be attributed to its historically liberal policy regarding foreign investment. 10 Conventional wisdom maintains that increasing the interrelation of different economies unites disparate national
interests and promotes stability. 11 At the same time, encouraging FDI in
10. Gerald T. Nowak, Note, Above All, Do No Harm: The Application of the ExonFlorio Amendment to Dual-Use Technologies, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1002, 1014 (1992)
(noting that the Erie Canal and the Louisiana Purchase were both financed by foreign
capital).
11. LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 6; Eben Kaplan,
Foreign Ownership of U.S. Infrastructure, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Feb. 13,
2007,http://www.cfr.org/publication/10092/foreign_ownership_of_us_infrastructure.html
[hereinafter Kaplan, Foreign Ownership]; see also UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
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the United States creates reciprocal opportunities for U.S. companies
abroad. 12 Foreign investment helps fuel robust growth in the U.S. economy by providing capital to finance demands for investment that exceed
the domestic economy’s supply. 13 Foreign companies in the United
States produce a significant percentage of U.S. exports and jobs. 14 In addition, foreign dollars spent in the United States on research and development contribute to the modernization and development of valuable
products and technology 15 or enable a particular company or corporate
division to continue operating in the United States. 16
Within this context, new national security concerns emerged following
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York.
Citing the modern transformation of business and government operations
and their shared interdependence on “critical physical and information
ACCOUNTING OFFICE [GAO], FOREIGN INVESTMENT: CONCERNS IN THE BANKING,
PETROLEUM, CHEMICALS, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY SECTORS, GAO/NSIAD-90-129, 4 (May
30, 1990) (arguing that “foreign investments . . . should encourage increased stability by
linking the economic interests of . . . countries with those of the United States”) [hereinafter GAO May 1990]; GAO, CONTROLLING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN NATIONAL
INTEREST SECTORS OF THE U.S. ECONOMY, GAO/ID-77-18, 38 (Oct. 7, 1977) [hereinafter
GAO Oct. 1977]; Davis B. Bobrow & Robert T. Kudrle, Economic Interdependence and
Security: U.S. Trade and Investment Policy for a New Era, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 61,
77 (1994) (pointing out that foreign investment is more important for high technology
sectors of the U.S. economy than other parts).
12. Kaplan, Foreign Ownership, supra note 11; see also Bobrow & Kudrle, supra
note 11, at 77.
13. JAMES K. JACKSON, FINANCING THE U.S. TRADE DEFICIT, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE [CRS] RL33274, 11 (Feb. 14, 2006) (“foreign capital inflows are
needed to fill the gap between the demand for capital in the economy and the domestic
supply of capital”); CRAIG ELWELL, THE U.S. TRADE DEFICIT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
AND CURES, CRS RL31032, 5 (Aug. 12, 2004).
It is an economic identity that the amount of investment undertaken by an
economy will be equal to the amount of saving—that is, the portion of current
income not used for consumption—that is available to finance investment. But
for a nation, this identity can be satisfied through the use of both domestic and
foreign saving, or, domestic and foreign investment.
Id.
14. The trade deficit was in excess of $725 billion in 2005. Foreign companies provide 5.3 million American jobs (often with higher wages than U.S. jobs) and produce
twenty-one percent of U.S. exports. Kaplan, Foreign Ownership, supra note 12. The U.S.
trade deficit last year widened more than seventeen percent from the previous year, and
the only way to finance this deficit is by attracting foreign investment. Bernard Wysocki,
Jr. et al., Port Debate Exposes Conflicts Between Security Needs and Foreign Investment,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2006, at A1.
15. See LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 7.
16. See id. at 22.
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infrastructures,” Congress enacted the Critical Infrastructures Protection
Act of 2001. 17 Critical infrastructure “means systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or
any combination of those matters.” 18 This definition is the linchpin for
subsequent homeland security and national defense legislation. 19 In the
National Strategy for Homeland Security, the White House emphasized
two axes of security vulnerability: infrastructure that delivers critical
functions or services and the complex interdependency between them
such that a successful attack at any point in these systems can reverberate
throughout. 20 Threats include those presented by the privileged access of
employees to information on “vulnerabilities, operations, and protective
measures” for critical infrastructure or direct facilitation of attacks
through provision of access to sensitive areas like loading docks, control
centers, and airport tarmacs. 21
Following the DPW deal, these broad national security concerns precipitated a reexamination of the nature and role of FDI in the United
States. 22 Although Congress empowered the executive branch with broad
authority in situations of national emergency, 23 the emergency powers do
not apply extraterritorially. 24 Furthermore, foreign firms within the
United States and abroad may be subject to influence by their home
country governments or may suffer security breaches compromising sen17. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(a) & (b).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e).
19. See generally NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 5. The National Strategy for
Homeland Security identifies agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services,
government, defense industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemical industry, postal, and shipping sectors as critical
infrastructure. Id. at 29–30.
20. See id. at 30.
21. Id. at 34.
22. This Note uses the definition of foreign direct investment (FDI) provided in 15
C.F.R. § 806.15(a)(1), which states that FDI is “the ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one foreign person of ten per centum or more of the voting securities of an
incorporated U.S. business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated U.S.
business enterprise . . . .” 15 C.F.R. § 806.15(a)(1).
23. See, e.g., Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1917); International
Emergency Economy Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (1976); see Bobrow &
Kudrle, supra note 11, at 80 (commenting that “the U.S. government has legal means to
assure supply even from a foreign monopolist when its operations are located in the
United States . . . the special emergency measures do not apply when the source of investment is located outside U.S. jurisdiction”).
24. Bobrow & Kudrle, supra 11, at 80.
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sitive U.S. information. 25 The view that these risks warrant regulation of
FDI in the United States reflects an underlying assumption that foreign
companies, unlike U.S. companies, operate under competing interests
that may undermine their compliance with U.S. laws and security. 26 With
respect to the DPW transaction in particular, this view took concrete
form when critics of the deal articulated concerns that Dubai’s ports were
a conduit for black market nuclear technology, that terrorists used Dubai’s financial centers to circumvent U.S. economic sanctions and funnel
funds, and that some September 11 terrorists were UAE citizens. 27
The interrelationship between FDI and national security presents a dilemma: allow foreign ownership and tolerate an unquantifiable risk to
national security or restrict foreign ownership and tolerate reduced capital and attendant business difficulties for U.S. firms. 28 Balanced against
favoring the national security concern in this relationship is that the
United States plays a significant role in defining global economic policy. 29 Tightening the reins on foreign investment in the United States
may well reinforce isolationist urges elsewhere, with long-term consequences to American interests at home and abroad. 30 Given the interconnectedness of critical infrastructure, 31 greater security may require attracting foreign firms, not only because they provide expertise and capital, but because U.S. security depends on reciprocal security arrangements with both private and government owned and operated infrastructure worldwide. 32
Striking the right balance between the competing values of open investment and national security remains especially important because examination of the data on foreign investment suggests that the United
States has not used FDI as a vehicle for aligning foreign interests with its
25. Id.; LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 9–10.
26. Kaplan, Foreign Ownership, supra note 12; LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 9.
27. Spindle et al., supra note 3; Bill Spindle & Yasmine El-Rashidi, In Quest to Build
A Financial Center, Hurdles for Dubai, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2006, at A1; Lawrence
Lindsey, Not For Sale to Foreigners, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2006, at A18.
28. See GAO, FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ANALYZING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS,
GAO/NSIAD-90-94, 26 (Mar. 1990) [hereinafter GAO Mar. 1990].
29. LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 6.
30. See, e.g., id.; McMahon, supra note 2; Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Op-Ed., You Can’t
Be CFIUS, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2006, at A8.
31. Electricity, petroleum pipelines, trade, and the global transportation system are
examples. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 35.
32. Ports and airports are examples of critical infrastructure that present a curious
mixture of state and private interests both in the United States and worldwide. LARSON &
MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 31.
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own with equal consistency or success in all countries. 33 Although ninety
percent of foreign investment in the United States derives from members
of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 34
the vast majority of that investment originates in countries that are already U.S. allies. 35 In contrast, investments originating in the Middle
East represent a small percentage of FDI in the U.S. economy, even
though Middle Eastern countries are a significant destination of American goods and American FDI. 36 In 2004, Middle Eastern countries invested a relatively small $192 million in hard U.S. assets, but Middle
East oil exporters also held $121.1 billion in U.S. securities, providing an
untapped resource for investment in hard U.S. assets. 37 Similarly, Venezuela is a relatively insignificant percentage of FDI in the U.S. economy, 38 although American investment represents fifty-three percent of
FDI in Venezuela. 39 The investments, valued at approximately $10.8 billion, are diversified among petroleum, telecommunications, manufacturing, and finance sectors. The United States relies heavily on Venezuela
33. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
34. The OECD is the successor to the organization created to administer aid under the
Marshall Plan following World War II. Today the organization is dedicated to the maintenance and development of free market economies. There are currently thirty member
states, including the United States. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, ABOUT OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_201185_
1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited May 27, 2007). The majority of foreign investment is in
liquid assets; in 2004, “foreigners held $1.9 trillion in U.S. corporate stocks, $2.2 trillion
in government securities, $2.1 trillion in private bonds and $2.9 trillion in debt . . . according to the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis . . . $2.7 trillion . .
. is invested in hard assets.” Wysocki, Jr. et al., supra note 14. Insofar as there are risks
associated with liquid holdings in the United States that stem from the destabilizing effects of sudden withdrawals, increasing physical holdings of foreign firms provides ballast in the form of “a more permanent stake in the health of the U.S. economy.” LARSON
& MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 23.
35. The greater percentage of foreign investment in the United States comes from the
United Kingdom and the European Union. See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT
2005 and UNCTAD WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2006 available at
www.unctad.org/fdistatistics; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE:
UNITED KINGDOM, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3846.htm (last visited May 27, 2007).
36. MARY JANE BOLLE, MIDDLE EAST FREE TRADE AREA: PROGRESS REPORT, CRS
RL32638, 5–7 (2006).
37. These numbers exclude Israel. Wysocki, Jr. et al., supra note 14.
38. Venezuelan FDI totals $5.5 billion, compared with $252 billion from the United
Kingdom. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/63553.htm (last visited May 27, 2007).
39. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, VENEZUELA 2005 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT,
www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2005/43503.html (last visited May 27, 2007), U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: VENEZUELA, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm
(last visited May 27, 2007).
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for its oil needs, and the United States trade deficit is on the rise, weighing in at $19.5 billion in 2004. 40 This data, which shows a vast untapped
pool of foreign capital, suggests that by shifting the balance in favor of
national security so as to preclude investment from countries like the
UAE or Venezuela, the United States would lose a significant opportunity to increase economic interdependence, align foreign interests with
its own, and thereby improve national security.
The controversy that emerged regarding the DPW and Smartmatic
deals are manifestations of the tension between traditional open investment policy and increased national security concerns. 41 Insofar as FDI
increases stability, and hence, security, by aligning national interests, the
chilly reception of DPW, the retroactive scrutiny of the Smartmatic deal,
and the proposed legislative reform fires a clear shot across the bow to
foreign investors and may well discourage future investments. 42
III. THE DILEMMA IN ACTION: DUBAI PORTS WORLD AND SMARTMATIC
TRANSACTIONS
A. Dubai Ports World
DPW is part of Ports Customs & Freezone Corp., a company owned by
the government of Dubai. 43 The company first entered the world stage
with the acquisition of the port facilities of CSX Corporation of Jacksonville, Florida, a U.S. company that had no ownership interests in U.S.
ports, but the acquisition of which expanded DPW’s existing reach in the
Middle East and India to include ports in China. 44 DPW cited its expansion as commercially motivated as part of a larger trend to global con40. U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: VENEZUELA,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm (last visited May 27, 2007) (Venezuela is
one of the United States’ four major foreign sources of oil); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
VENEZUELA 2005 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT, www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2005/
43503.html (last visited May 27, 2007).
41. See discussion infra Part III.
42. See, e.g., LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 6 (noting
that “both . . . economic health . . . and . . . long term security depend on . . . a welcoming
environment”); W. Robert Shearer, The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist Legislation Susceptible to Abuse, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1729, 1746–53 (1993) (discussing FDI and
its role in building a robust economy, which itself provides national security, and advocating a total repeal of the review process to avoid discouraging FDI).
43. The government of Dubai is one of seven emirates that joined to form the UAE in
1971. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5444.htm (last visited May 27, 2007); Spindle et al.,
supra note 3.
44. Spindle et al., supra note 3.
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solidation in the shipping and ports business. 45 The primary focus of
DPW’s attempt to acquire the British company, P&O, was to expand operations in China and India, thus complementing the geographic distribution of existing operations. 46 Although a company spokesperson stated
that “[t]he U.S. is not the focus of the acquisition,” 47 the acquisition of
P&O would give DPW control over terminals in six U.S. ports previously operated by the British company. 48
The seventh largest port operator in the world, DPW operates in fourteen countries, provides support to U.S. military in Germany, Djibouti,
and Dubai, and has been recognized for its high standards of port operation. 49 The senior management is composed of three citizens of the
United States, one of Great Britain, two of India, one of the Netherlands,
and four of Dubai. Of the four citizens of Dubai, two were educated at
American universities. 50 The acquisition of P&O Ports North America,
the U.S. operations of P&O, represented merely six to ten percent of the
overall transaction; three of the leases to be acquired were joint ventures
with U.S. companies. 51
Critics of the deal issued statements in the press, precipitating a media
uproar. Typically, reports focused on internal threats presented by the
deal, citing UAE ties to terrorism, such that a UAE company operating
U.S. ports would provide a conduit for terrorists to transport operatives
and weapons to the United States. 52 While media reports and congres45. Testimony Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (Statement of H. Edward Bilkey, Chief Operating Officer, Dubai Ports World),
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/bilkey-022806.pdf [hereinafter Bilkey, Testimony].
46. Spindle et al., supra note 3.
47. Id. (quoting the Dubai Ports World spokesperson).
48. DPW’s bid would affect operation of 850 port terminals in U.S. cities, including
New York, New Jersey, Baltimore, New Orleans, Miami, and Philadelphia. See Hudson,
supra note 6.
49. Bilkey, Testimony, supra note 45, at 1–2.
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id. at 2–3. The specific leases acquired are for port terminals located in Baltimore;
Philadelphia, which was a fifty-fifty joint venture with Stevedoring Services of America;
Miami, which was a fifty percent stake in Port of Miami Terminal Operating Company;
New Orleans; and Newark, a fifty-fifty joint venture in the Port of Newark Container
Terminal with Maersk Terminals. There were additional general stevedoring and cargo
handling operations at additional locations and a passenger terminal in New York. Id.
The $6.8 billion deal involved ports in eighteen countries. Q&A: U.S. Row Over Dubai
Ports, BBC NEWS, Mar. 9 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4789368.stm [hereinafter BBC NEWS, Q&A].
52. Critics specifically cited that two airplane hijackers involved in the 2001 World
Trade Center attacks were from the UAE and that terrorist groups used the UAE a base of
operations. Critics also emphasized that UAE is a primarily Arab and Muslim state. Kaplan, UAE Purchase, supra note 3; Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Op-Ed., A Salute to Bush for
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sional statements inflamed public concerns, parties challenged the acquisition in courts in Great Britain, Florida, and New Jersey; all claims were
rejected or rendered nugatory by subsequent developments. 53
DPW contacted CFIUS to discuss the planned acquisition on October
17, 2005, and within two weeks, CFIUS engaged in an extensive preliminary review of the proposed transaction. 54 Official CFIUS review
commenced on December 15, 2005. 55 Following its review, CFIUS recommended measures that would mitigate the national security concerns
represented by the deal. Concessions included advance notice to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for changes in security arrangements, assignation of management of U.S. facilities to U.S. citizens, and
the provision of confidential records relating to port management and
employees without a subpoena. 56 DPW consented to the terms, and on
January 17, 2006, CFIUS issued a formal letter allowing the acquisition

Standing Against Port Takeover Storm, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 27, 2006, available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=602.
53. A federal judge rejected New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine’s request for an investigation and permission to inspect the documents submitted to CFIUS. Eller & Co, a stevedoring company in the Miami-Dade ports, attempted to block the takeover claiming
that their business would be harmed by American retaliation if an Arab company were
allowed to operate its ports. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey filed suit in
New Jersey state court to block the take over of operations at Port Newark. The plaintiffs
sought relief on grounds that the landlord failed to seek approval of the tenants as required by the thirty year lease, emphasizing that as owners they needed to be “comfortable that whoever operates it is capable of it.” They also alleged that the federal government had provided inadequate assurances about security issues. See Ports Deal News
Tracker, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Feb. 28, 2006, Mar. 1, 2006, & Mar. 2, 2006,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114071649414581503.html.
54. Bilkey, Testimony, supra note 45, at 5.
55. Id. at 6. This sequence of events reflects standard operating practice for CFIUS.
The governing statute imposes a short time-line for review, so a given transaction is extensively discussed before “official notice” is filed, triggering formal review and the
statutory clock. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.401.
56. Specifically, DPW conceded it would: 1) maintain current levels of membership
and cooperation in security arrangements; 2) provide DHS with thirty days advance notice of change in membership or cooperation in security arrangements; 3) operate U.S.
facilities to the extent possible with current U.S. management; 4) designate a responsible
corporate officer to serve as point of contact with the DHS on security matters; 5) provide
relevant information promptly to DHS upon request; 6) assist and support law enforcement agencies (including disclosing information on the design, manufacture and operation of U.S. facilities); and 7) provide records relating to foreign operation direction, if
any, of the U.S. facilities. Bilkey, Testimony, supra note 45, at 6–7; Robert Block, Chertoff Says U.S. Ports Takeover Would Tighten Grip on Security, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27,
2006, at A3; Greg Hitt, White House Cites Extra Safeguards in Ports Deal, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 23, 2006, at A3.
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to proceed. 57 Following the media uproar, CFIUS, with the cooperation
of DPW and P&O, commenced a second-stage extended investigation,
which resulted in additional security concessions, including an interim
agreement between DPW and P&O to permit the management and control of the North American operation to continue without direction or
control from DPW until May 1, 2006 or until final approval of the transaction. 58 As furor over the deal refused to abate, DPW made additional
unprecedented concessions: to install state-of-the-art radiation and
gamma ray inspection devices at all current and future U.S. and foreign
ports managed by DPW at company expense (estimated $100 million
cost); to grant the DHS a right to veto the choice of chief executive,
board members, security officials, and all senior officers; and to create a
supermajority of U.S. citizens on the board of directors. 59 DPW ultimately responded to American concerns by divesting its leases to American ports. 60
B. Smartmatic
The transaction at issue in the Smartmatic controversy is its acquisition
of Sequoia Voting Systems (SVS), completed in March 2005. 61 Unlike
P&O, the target of the DPW acquisition, SVS is an American company
based in California that has provided voting equipment nationwide since
the 1890s. 62 Smartmatic is privately held, with ninety-seven percent
owned by four Venezuelan founders. 63 It owes its recent rise to a series
of voting contracts with the government of Venezuela, the first of which
was awarded in 2004, the year Hugo Chávez was confirmed President of
Venezuela by popular referendum. 64 The company, in conjunction with
Bizta, another small start-up, won contracts from American competitors. 65 The proceeds from those contracts allowed Smartmatic to acquire
57. Bilkey, Testimony, supra note 45, at 7.
58. Id. at 7–8.
59. DPW also volunteered to maintain all records relating to security operations on
U.S. soil available on request and to establish a Security and Financial Oversight Board
chaired by American citizens reporting annually to the DHS. Neil King, Jr., DP World
Tried to Soothe U.S. Waters, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2006, at A4.
60. BBC NEWS, Q&A, supra note 51.
61. Alphonso Chardy, U.S. Digs for Vote-Machine Links to Hugo Chávez, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 28, 2006, at A1.
62. Press Release, Sequoia Voting Systems, Sequoia Voting Systems Responds to
Venezuela-Related Rumors and Misinformation (May 11, 2006), http://www.sequoia
vote.com/article.php?id=74.
63. Chardy, supra note 61.
64. Golden, supra note 1.
65. Id.
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SVS as part of a larger global sales and marketing plan to establish its
leadership in electronic voting worldwide. 66 Following acquisition by
Smartmatic, SVS’s sales spiked, and its machines were used in sixteen
states in 2006. 67
Smartmatic, originally a single office headquartered in Florida, just
prior to its acquisition of SVS, reincorporated in an elaborate structure of
holding companies; critics pointed to this as evidence of the company’s
attempt to obfuscate its ownership. 68 In addition, Bizta, an entirely separate company, obtained a loan from the Venezuelan government, which
received a twenty-eight percent stake in Bizta as guarantee and pursuant
to which the Venezuelan government appointed a senior official to the
company’s board of directors. 69 According to critics, because two members of the Bizta board are also on the board of Smartmatic, the Venezuelan government could exert influence over Smartmatic, 70 even though the
loan to Bizta was discharged in 2004 before Smartmatic bought Bizta in
2005. 71
Thus, critics, citing concerns that the Venezuelan government may be
able to wield influence over American elections by virtue of its connections to Smartmatic, brought the acquisition to the attention of President
Bush in May 2006. 72 On October 29, 2006, Smartmatic and SVS issued a
press release announcing they had voluntarily notified CFIUS, and had
submitted information regarding ownership and security of their voting
products for review. 73 In the same release, the company clarified that

66. Id.
67. Bob Davis, Smartmatic to Shed U.S. Unit, End Probe into Venezuelan Links,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2006, at A6 (also noting that the Justice Department had conducted
an investigation into whether Smartmatic paid bribes to Venezuelan officials to win the
2004 election contract).
68. The holding companies were set up in in trusts based in Delaware, the Netherlands, and the Caribbean. Golden, supra note 1.
69. Davis, supra note 67.
70. Golden, supra note 1.
71. Davis supra note 67.
72. See Golden, supra note 1.
73. Press Release, Sequoia Voting Systems, Smartmatic and Sequoia Voting Systems
Announce Voluntary CFIUS Filing (Oct. 29, 2006), http://www.sequoia
vote.com/article.php?id=79 (the press release identified three entrepreneurs as the primary owners: Antonio Mugica, with 78.8%; Alfredo Anzola, with 3.87%; and Roger
Pinate, with 8.47%) [hereinafter SVS Oct. 29, 2006 Press Release]. In contrast, Representative Maloney asserted in a press release that:
[w]hen I first raised this case with Treasury, I thought that it was ripe for a
CFIUS investigation, because the integrity of our voting machines is vital to
national security. At that time, Smartmatic flatly refused to undergo a CFIUS
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“[n]o foreign government or entity—including Venezuela—has ever held
an ownership stake in Smartmatic.” 74 Subsequently, on December 22,
2006, Smartmatic obtained CFIUS approval to withdraw from the review
process, and announced plans to sell SVS. 75 As with the DPW ports deal,
the Sequoia voting machines became the subject of litigation when a suit
was brought against New Jersey elections officials alleging that “the state
did not properly certify the machines and that the equipment could not
adequately protect against vote fraud.” 76
While the DPW controversy should be viewed in light of domestic
concerns regarding port security following the events of September 11,
2001, concerns regarding the Smartmatic transaction must be viewed in
light of the vocal hostility of the Chávez government to the Bush administration, partisan voting controversies following Bush v. Gore, 77 and larger policy concerns regarding the security and integrity of electronic voting systems. 78
review. But . . . the company could not overcome the cloud of doubt . . . had
they been able to, we would not be talking about a sale of Sequoia today.
Press Release, Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY), Smartmatic Announces It Will Sell Sequoia Voting Systems, Withdraw from CFIUS Review (Dec. 22, 2006),
http://maloney.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1255&Itemid
=61 [hereinafter Maloney Press Release].
74. SVS Oct. 29, 2006 Press Release, supra note 73.
75. N.Y. TIMES, Voting Machine Maker for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at A17
(quoting Sequoia officials that the controversy would have no effect on the company’s
role in U.S. elections); Press Release, Sequoia Voting Systems, Smartmatic Corporation
and Sequoia Voting Systems Move to Align Corporate Structures with Future Business
Goals (Dec. 22, 2006), http://www.sequoiavote.com/article.php?id=82 (noting that the
U.S. Election Assistance Commission had not raised any concerns regarding the use of
the company’s products in the 2006 elections, that the products met the highest industry
standards, and that the products had passed “extensive federal and state testing”).
76. Richard G. Jones, Proof Sought on Reliability of Vote Units, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2007, at B4.
77. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Ian Urbina, U.S. Panel is Said to Alter Finding
on Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2007, at A1.
78. The GAO issued a 2007 report documenting security problems in voting systems,
the latest in a series of reports since 2001. GAO, ELECTIONS: ALL LEVELS OF
GOVERNMENT ARE NEEDED TO ADDRESS ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM CHALLENGES,
GAO-07-576T (Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Mar. 7, 2007). Most recently, the standoff between the United States and Venezuela was demonstrated when President Chávez
called President Bush “the devil” at the United Nations and Venezuela’s challenge to the
U.S. nomination of Guatemala to the United Nations Security Council. Warren Hoge,
Venezuelan’s Diatribe Seen as Fatal to U.N. Council Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2006, at
A6; After 41 U.N. Ballots, Venezuela-Guatemala Logjam Persists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
2006, at A12; see also Michael Isikoff & Joseph Contreras, Ortega and Ollie—Again,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 2006, at 9 (observing that the Bush administration is concerned
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IV. CHANGING THE PARADIGM
Following the Dubai Port World deal in 2006, two bills emerged as key
contenders for CFIUS reform. Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama proposed the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2006 (S.
3549), which passed the Senate with unanimous consent. 79 A second bill,
the National Security Foreign Investment Reform and Strengthened
Transparency Act of 2006 (H.R. 5337), sponsored by Representative Roy
Blunt of Missouri, passed the House with near unanimous approval. 80
Both seek to amend the Exon-Florio and CFIUS review process encapsulated in the Defense Production Act of 1950 and related executive orders.
The way the current law and the proposed bill structure the CFIUS inquiry reflect two different views regarding the proper framework for
analysis of risks presented by FDI. The paradigm reflected in the existing
law may be characterized as a totality of the circumstances test, whereas
the changes proposed in the Senate bill introduce a minimum threshold
analysis. In the former, the significance of any one factor is weighed
against the entire situation presented by the transaction. In the latter, certain types of activity and contacts trigger heightened scrutiny to determine if they are substantial enough to suggest impairment of national
security. The differences between these two approaches reflect a fundamental shift in the relative primacy of open investment versus national
security in the review process.
A. The Current FDI Review Process: The Totality of the Circumstances
Paradigm
The principle inquiry in the existing Exon-Florio review process,
which was first established in 1975 81 and expanded by Congress in
1988, 82 is triggered by voluntary notice from parties to a transaction. 83
Venezuelan President Chávez may be lending financial support to the re-election of exSandinista leader Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua).
79. Foreign Investment and National Security Act, S. 3549, 109th Cong. (2006).
80. National Security Foreign Investment Reform and Strengthened Transparency
Act, H.R. 5337, 109th Cong. (2006)
81. President Gerald Ford created CFIUS by executive order in 1975, but the executive branch had no authority to interfere in FDI aside from the President’s powers to declare a national emergency or if regulatory authority under federal antitrust, environmental or securities laws. International Emergency Economic Powers, 50 U.S.C. §§
1701–1706; Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 F.R. 20,263 (May 7, 1975).
82. The review process in present form derives from a 1988 amendment to § 721 of
the Defense Production Act (1950), the so-called Exon-Florio Amendment, which expanded presidential authority to block foreign acquisitions that threatened national security and formalized the CFIUS review process, which had proceeded on an informal basis
pursuant to an executive order. The President delegated the authority granted him by the
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Individual CFIUS members may also notify the committee of a transaction. 84 CFIUS, originally consisting of six members, has expanded to its
present membership of twelve representatives of different departments
and offices of the executive branch. 85
In the two-prong inquiry, CFIUS must first determine whether there is
credible evidence that a foreign person acquiring control may take action
that threatens to impair national security and second, whether existing
laws, other than Exon-Florio and the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, provide the President insufficient authority to protect national security in the matter before the President. 86 No particularized
definition of “national security” was provided; legislators deliberately
left the term to interpretation so as to ensure it would not be delimited by
industry. 87
Although notice is voluntary, consequences for failing to file are severe
because failure to secure CFIUS approval or to fully disclose or to misrepresent in the process subjects the transaction to divestiture if at any
1988 Exon-Florio Amendment to CFIUS via executive order. The Defense Production
Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,661, 40 F.R. 779 (Dec.
27, 1988); see generally JAMES K. JACKSON, THE EXON-FLORIO NATIONAL SECURITY TEST
FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT, CRS 22197, 2 (Feb. 23, 2006) (providing an overview of the
legislative and regulatory history) [hereinafter JACKSON, NATIONAL SECURITY TEST].
83. 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(a) (voluntary notice by a party to a transaction). The Department of Treasury first promulgated guidelines in 1991. See JACKSON, NATIONAL
SECURITY TEST, supra note 82, at 4.
84. 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(b).
85. Executive departments represented on CFIUS include: Department of Treasury
(Chair), Department of Commerce, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense. Executive offices of the
President represented on CFIUS include: Office of Management and Budget, Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative, Council of Economic Advisers, Office of Science and
Technology Policy, National Security Council, and the National Economic Council. See
Saxton, Committee Report, supra note 86.
86. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e); see also Jim Saxton, Committee on Foreign Investment
in the United States, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE RESEARCH REPORT 109-34, Mar. 2006,
available at www.house.gov/jec [hereinafter Saxton, Committee Report]. Industries such
as power, banking, maritime, and aircraft are governed by industry-specific regulation
that imposes limitations on foreign ownership. A report to Congress by the Comptroller
General in 1977 examined the statutory framework governing these different sectors of
“national interest” and concluded there was no need to introduce an additional layer of
review on the influx of foreign capital because existing legislation already specifically
addressed the risks of foreign ownership in those industries. GAO Oct. 1977, supra note
11, at 6–22, 38; see also JACKSON, NATIONAL SECURITY TEST, supra note 82, at 3.
87. “Critical technologies” are defined, but “national security” is not. See 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2170 (k)(2); see also JACKSON, NATIONAL SECURITY TEST, supra note 82, at 3 (citing 134 CONG. REC. H2118 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1988)).
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time the acquisition raises security concerns. 88 Compliance gives the
transaction the benefit of a safe harbor provision, minimizing risk of subsequent review or action by the President. 89
The two-prong inquiry whereby CFIUS adduces the existence of credible evidence of a threat to national security and whether existing laws
provide the President with sufficient authority to protect national security
governs both phases of the CFIUS process: an initial thirty-day review
and a second-stage forty-five day investigation. 90 If, upon completing the
first-stage thirty day review, CFIUS is unable to resolve security concerns with the parties to the transaction, the companies will either withdraw notice to provide more time, or if withdrawal is not feasible either
because the company refuses or the security risks are too great, CFIUS
will proceed to a second stage, entailing a more extensive forty-five day
investigation. 91 At all stages of the process, CFIUS proceeds by consensus; consequently, the objection of any one of the member agencies at
the conclusion of the first-stage thirty day review triggers the secondstage forty-five day investigation, and upon conclusion of the investigation, if CFIUS cannot reach consensus regarding a recommended course
88. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d); 31 C.F.R. § 800.601(d)–(e).
89. 31 C.F.R. § 800.601(d). The regulation states that:
[a]ll authority available to the President under section 721(d), including divestment authority, shall remain available at the discretion of the President in
respect of acquisitions which have been concluded at any time on or after the
effective date, but only if the purpose for which divestment or other appropriate
relief is sought is based on facts, conditions, or circumstances existing at the
time the transaction was concluded. Such authority shall not be exercised if:
(1) The Committee, through its Staff Chairman, has in writing advised a party (or the parties) that a particular transaction, with respect
to which voluntary notice was attempted, was not subject to section
721;
(2) The Committee has previously determined under § 800.502 not to
undertake an investigation of the acquisition when proposed, pending, or completed; or
(3) The President has previously determined not to exercise his authority under section 721 with respect to that acquisition.
Id.
90. 50 U.S.C. § 5170(e); 31 C.F.R. § 800.501(a); see also LARSON & MARCHICK,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 13.
91. A company may, provided CFIUS approves, withdraw its notice at any time prior
to the president’s final decision. 31 C.F.R. § 800.505; see also LARSON & MARCHICK,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 14–15. For review periods, see 31 C.F.R. §
800.404(a) (commencing thirty day review period) and § 800.504(a) (conclusion of investigation after forty-five days).
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of action for the President, the report to the President must represent dissenting views. 92
The existing law, whereby the mechanism is permissive, discretionary,
ad hoc, and incorporates discreet reporting requirements, provides an
example of a totality of the circumstances paradigm under which national
security concerns are subordinated to the open investment principle. For
example, although an investigation is required where the party acquiring
control is a foreign government or person acting on behalf of a foreign
government, the statute is otherwise permissive, accepting voluntary notifications from parties to a transaction. 93 Furthermore, Exon-Florio
stipulates merely that CFIUS “may” consider several different factors in
its inquiry, including the effect of the proposed investment on domestic
production for projected national defense requirements, the consequences
of sales of military technology to countries of concern with respect to
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and the potential effects of
the proposed transaction on U.S. defense technology leadership. 94 Consequently, the inquiry underlying the review and investigation entails
consideration of both the past conduct and future intentions of the individual investor, and to a lesser extent, the nation of origin of the invest-

92. 31 C.F.R. § 800.504; LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7,
at 14.
93. On voluntary notice, see 31 C.F.R. § 800.601. The mandatory investigation requirement concerning foreign governments was introduced by the so-called Byrd
Amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950, enacted in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 837(b) (1992), and codified as 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (b). See also JACKSON, NATIONAL SECURITY TEST, supra
note 82, at 3, note 11.
94. The statute specifically suggests consideration of:
1) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements, 2)
the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense requirements, including the availability of human resources, products, technology, materials, and other supplies and services, 3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability
and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of national security,
4) the potential effects of the . . . transaction on the sales of military goods,
equipment, or technology to any country (A) identified by the Secretary of
State . . . or (B) listed under . . . the ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Special Country
List’ . . . and 5) the potential effects of the . . . transaction on United States international technological leadership in areas affecting United States national
security.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (f); see also JACKSON, NATIONAL SECURITY TEST, supra note 82, at
3–4.
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ment, but only insofar as this presents credible evidence of an impairment of national security. 95
While the current law does not define national security, suggesting the
scope of review is unlimited, in fact, the compass of these factors delineate the core inquiry for CFIUS, largely limiting its purview to acquisitions of controlling interests that have measurable consequences for the
present and future capacity to meet defense production requirements. 96
At the same time, the undefined scope of national security encourages
voluntary notification of CFIUS because where there is a question regarding whether or not a given transaction will implicate national security concerns, corporations seek to benefit from the safe harbor provision
to minimize the risk of subsequent divestment. 97 Furthermore, in declining to specify national security or to articulate a mandatory list of factors
for consideration, the current law permits CFIUS discretion to prioritize
transactions for review and investigation, permitting it to traverse industries, formulations of management control, and chains of relationships to
assess how, in the facts of a specific case, the transaction may implicate
national security concerns. 98
95. On the balance between consideration of past and future conduct of an investor in
evaluating security risks, see GAO May 1990, supra note 11, at 3; GAO Mar. 1990, supra note 28, at 12; GAO, NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEWS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT,
GAO/T-NSIAD-91-08, 9–10 (Feb. 26, 1991) (Testimony of Allan I. Mendelowitz) [hereinafter GAO Feb. 1991]. The Department of Treasury regulations define “control” as “the
power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised . . . to determine, direct, take reach or
cause decisions regarding . . . ” matters including: the transfer of principal assets; dissolution; closing or relocation of production, research, or development facilities; termination
or non-fulfillment of contracts; and amendment of the entity’s operative agreement. The
regulation also stipulates that where more than one foreign person has an interest, “consideration will be given to factors such as whether the foreign persons are related and/or
whether they have commitments to act in concert.” 31 C.F.R. 800.204 (a) & (b).
96. “They required policy judgments about the consequences of dependence on foreign semiconductor firms for both the U.S. civilian and military sectors. Such decisions
would require making assumptions about the Japanese firm’s intentions regarding the
market power and technology transfer that it would gain from the acquisition.” GAO
Mar. 1990, supra note 28, at 22 (discussing a Japanese firm’s proposed purchase of a
U.S. semiconductor producer).
97. Id. at 14 (noting that failure to “provide a clear definition of national security or
the criteria [meant] attorneys representing potential foreign investors feel compelled to
clear most foreign investments with CFIUS before completing the transactions”); GAO
DEFENSE TRADE: IDENTIFYING FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY
CAN BE IMPROVED, GAO/NSIAD-00-144, 5 (June 2000) [hereinafter GAO June 2000].
98. “CFIUS evaluates investment on a case-by-case basis and is able to gather extensive information about the firms involved . . . CFIUS does not perform analyses of foreign investment by industry sector, nor does it examine other larger questions which have
arisen in public debate.” GAO Feb. 1991, supra note 95, at 9–10.
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In addition, specific transactions are typically approved pending implementation of certain conditions, including limitations on involvement
of an acquiring foreign party through, for example, addition of American
citizens to the board. 99 These limitations are specifically tailored to address the security concerns of different agencies and are implemented in
mitigation agreements. These agreements may include penalties for noncompliance and entail obligations greater than those usually required of
domestic companies. 100 If no measures are perceived adequate to address
the national security concerns raised by the transaction, CFIUS may recommend the President block the deal. 101
Strict requirements for confidentiality govern the review and investigation process, and as a corollary, the reporting requirements to Congress
are limited. The statute, in its current form, requires a report to the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives only
upon the President’s final determination whether or not to take action. 102
The President’s decision-making authority is only triggered upon completion of the discretionary second-stage forty-five day investigation by
CFIUS. 103 The statute also requires a report to Congress every four years,
which is intended to assist Congress in its oversight responsibilities by
providing an assessment of whether the FDI activity in the prior fouryear period provides credible evidence of a coordinated state-driven
strategy to erode U.S. critical technology leadership. 104 The limited and
99. For example, the acquisition of IBM’s personal computer business by Chinese
computer-maker Lenovo was approved provided it included additional security measures.
See McMahon, supra note 2. Approval of the 2000 acquisition of Verio, Inc., an Internet
service provider, by Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Company was contingent upon a
strict prohibition against Japanese government involvement; the 2003 acquisition of
Global Crossing, Ltd. by Hong Kong Hutchinson Whampoa Ltd. and Singapore Technologies Telemedia was contingent upon the passivity of Hutchison in management because of Hutchinson’s connections to the Chinese military. Hutchinson eventually withdrew but Technologies Telemedia proceeded based on a concession to place Americans
on the board of Global Crossing. JACKSON, NATIONAL SECURITY TEST, supra note 82, at
5.
100. LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 11–12.
101. See 31 C.F.R. 800.504(b); LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra
note 7, at 11–12.
102. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (g). Prior to the 1992 amendments, the President was only
required to report to Congress if he exercised authority to block an acquisition. GAO,
DEFENSE TRADE: MITIGATING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS UNDER EXON-FLORIO
COULD BE IMPROVED, GAO-02-736, 1 (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter GAO Sept. 2002].
103. 31 C.F.R. § 800.504.
104. For example, through acquisition of U.S. companies engaged in the research,
development, and production of critical technologies or through industrial espionage. 50
U.S.C. app. § 2170 (k)(1).
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discreet nature of these reporting requirements reflects an overall emphasis on discretion and confidentiality.
The totality of the circumstances paradigm reflected in the current law,
characterized, as described above, by a voluntary, discretionary, and ad
hoc review mechanism with limited reporting requirements, is responsive
to the problem that threats to national security are likely to change over
time and the nature of the threat presented by any given transaction is
highly fact specific. The broad scope of “national security” preserves
executive discretion to respond to these threats as they emerge. 105 Simultaneously, the scope of the factors the statute suggests for review allows
for effective prioritization of resources in response to these emerging
threats. In addition, the entirely voluntary notification system avoids the
appearance of a mandatory screening process while ensuring adequate
review of transactions that entail security concerns. 106 This is reinforced
by a strong incentive to provide notice, because the transaction may be
subject to divestment at any time. 107 The reliance on negotiated mitigation agreements ensures that the means are narrowly tailored to the specific potential negative security consequences of a transaction while
minimizing the risk that a particular transaction could be burdened with
the costs of larger national security concerns. 108 Finally, the strict confidentiality requirements and limited reporting means reviews are, for the
most part, safely sequestered from the political arena. 109
On the other hand, the existing regime may be criticized as underinclusive. Reliance on a system of voluntary notification likely results in
under-reporting of transactions that present security risks, as some would
105. See, e.g., Alan F. Holmer, Judith H. Bello, & Jeremy O. Preiss, The Final ExonFlorio Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment: The Final Word or Prelude to Tighter
Controls?, 23 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 593, 609 (1992).
106. Id. at 595, 609–610 (observing that the open definition of national security encourages filing, and that the burdens are small because parties are free to consult with
CFIUS to elicit guidance, especially in the context of large corporate transactions);
LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 11 (discussing the “specter” of mandatory investment screening and noting that the current regime encourages
filing if there is “any possibility that a transaction might raise national security issues”).
107. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (d); see also Saxton, Committee Report, supra note 86
(noting that “compliance is very high because the President may order the divestment of a
domestic acquisition at any time in the future if the foreign acquirer did not notify
CFIUS”).
108. See, e.g., Matthew R. Byrne, Note, Protecting National Security and Promoting
Foreign Investment: Maintaining the Exon-Florio Balance, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 890–
91, 904 (2006) (discussing benefits of mitigation agreements).
109. S. REP. NO. 109-264, 12 (2006); see LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT,
supra note 7, at 15–17 (discussing the generally limited involvement of both the legislative and executive branches, contributing to an apolitical review process).
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argue was the case with Smartmatic. 110 Moreover, the discretionary review may fail to take into account the national security implications of a
particular transaction in its broader geo-political context, as some would
argue was the case with DPW. 111 Similarly, the high order assigned to
confidentiality comes at the expense of congressional and public confidence in the adequacy of the review. 112 Finally, permissive withdrawal
regulations may allow an end-run on the review process because CFIUS
does not monitor drop-outs. 113 This problem is replicated in the failure to
monitor and enforce compliance with formal mitigation agreements. 114
Both instances permit a risk that deals presenting security concerns remain unaddressed. 115

110. Maloney Press Release, supra note 73 (Rep. Maloney commenting on Smartmatic
deal). The existing law does not always reach privately owned or smaller companies,
which may exclude “some of the most advanced technologies being developed.” GAO
Mar. 1990, supra note 28, at 15; see also GAO June 2000, supra note 97, at 7. This report
identified three transactions that were notified to member agencies but had not been reported to CFIUS. These included a 1999 acquisition of a U.S. manufacturer of ceramic
body armor by a German firm; a 1998 acquisition of a U.S. laser manufacturer by a
French firm; and a 1995 acquisition of a U.S. bearing manufacturer by a Hong Kong
firm. The ceramic body armor manufacturer and the bearing manufacturer could have
been captured by CFIUS because the companies deal in classified products that required
Department of Defense reporting; the laser manufacturer cancelled its defense contracts,
and did not believe its business fell within the purview of Exon-Florio. In all three cases,
the firms agreed to cooperate with CFIUS. Id. at 10–13.
111. As an example, critics of CFIUS handling of the DPW deal commented that the
current review process does not consider the underlying conditions in the UAE and the
company’s vulnerability to infiltration and corruption. Kaplan, UAE Purchase, supra
note 3 (quoting Congressman Peter King (R-NY)). Critics also expressed concern that the
scope of interests encompassed in national security review were limited to those parties
about whom threatening intelligence was reported and where the acquisition would affect
export-control technologies or classified contracts; it was not expanded to include consideration of U.S. critical infrastructure. Letter from Rep. Bennie Thompson to Comptroller General David Walker, (Feb. 23, 2006), http://hsc.house.gov/about/subcommi
tees.asp?ID=47&SubSection=0&Issue=0&DocumentType=0&PublishDate=0&subcomm
ittee=8.
112. S. REP. NO. 109-264, supra note 109, at 2; JACKSON, NATIONAL SECURITY TEST,
supra note 82, at 4.
113. The GAO reported that two deals were completed prior to filing with CFIUS
where notification was withdrawn because suitable mitigation measures could not be
agreed upon, and the companies failed to re-file. The GAO concluded “[a]s a result, potential threats to national security . . . remained.” GAO Sept. 2002, supra note 102 at 2.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 12 (discussing the need for post-mitigation agreement monitoring).
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B. The Senate Bill: The Minimum Threshold Paradigm
Following the DPW imbroglio, the Senate sought to reform the review
process. 116 In comparison to the existing totality of the circumstances
regime, the Senate bill effects a paradigm shift by incorporating a type of
minimum threshold analysis under which the review mechanism is mandatory, categorical, and incorporates expansive reporting requirements. 117 The proposed bill retains the mandatory investigation of investments by foreign governments or on behalf of a foreign government. 118 In addition, where the transaction implicates control of critical
infrastructure or where the security risks identified through review of an
expanded list of factors and, in both instances, the security concerns are
unmitigated, the bill requires CFIUS to undertake a forty-five day investigation. 119 Like the existing law, the bill declines to define “national security,” and retains the core factors for consideration in review and investigation discussed above, but limits the discretion of CFIUS by making their consideration mandatory. 120 The bill also introduces new factors, including, inter alia, potential effects on critical infrastructure and
technologies, whether the country of origin is a potential regional military threat, and individual country assessments. 121 The incorporation of
116. This has been a persistent concern with respect to the Exon-Florio review process
and it has elicited not infrequent GAO reports. See GAO, DEFENSE TRADE: NATIONAL
SECURITY REVIEWS OF FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS OF U.S. COMPANIES COULD BE IMPROVED,
GAO-07-661T, 8 (Mar. 23, 2007) (Statement of Ann M. Calvaresi-Barr) (discussing a
series of GAO reports since 2000) [hereinafter GAO Mar. 2007].
117. S. 3549 § 2.
118. The bill changes the voluntary notice provisions with regard to any transaction
involving a foreign government and critical infrastructure by making notification of
CFIUS in both of those circumstances mandatory, with penalties for non-compliance to
be promulgated by CFIUS following enactment of the bill. Id. § 2(b)(5).
119. Id. § 2 (b)(1)(A)(ii) & (b)(1)(B).
120. Id. § 2(g) (“For purposes of determining whether to take action . . . and for purposes of reviews and investigations . . . shall consider . . . .”) (emphasis added). On the
decision not to define “national security” for the purposes of CFIUS review, see supra
notes 87 & 97.
121. S. 3549 § 2(g)(1), (g)(2), & (g)(6)(B). Altogether, § 2(g) requires consideration
of:
(1) potential effects on United States critical infrastructure, including major energy assets; (2) potential effects on United States critical technologies; (3) domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements; (4) the
capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense requirements, including the availability of human resources, products, technology, materials, and other supplies and services; (5) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability
and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of national security;
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these particular factors and the fact that they are mandatory introduces
greater structure into the CFIUS inquiry, and creates a priori assumptions
about what kinds of conduct and activity give rise to a threat to impair
national security, reflecting a departure from the principle that has governed CFIUS in the past: ownership itself is a small part of a given vulnerability. 122
By incorporating critical infrastructure and technology as mandatory
criteria, the bill would require CFIUS to review and investigate transactions with unmitigated security risks that occur in any of the twenty-two
key critical infrastructure industries, implicating transactions in areas as
diverse as food supply and highways, bridges, and vaccinations. 123 The
same is true for critical technologies, which encompass dual-use technologies, and thus, technologies used for both private commercial and
defense contracting purposes are brought squarely within the purview of
CFIUS review. 124 The incorporation of these specific categories of indus(6) the potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on sales of military goods, equipment, or technology to any country (A) identified by the Secretary of State (i) . . . as a country that supports terrorism; (ii) . . . as a country
of concern regarding missile proliferation; or (iii) . . . as a country of concern
regarding the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons; (B) identified
by the Secretary of Defense as posing a potential regional military threat to the
interests of the United States; or (C) listed . . . on the ‘Nuclear NonProliferation Special Country list’ . . . ; (7) the potential effects of the proposed
or pending transaction on United States international technological leadership
in areas affecting United States national security; (8) the long term projection
of United States requirements for sources of energy and other critical resources
and materials; and (9) the assessments developed under subsection (c)(7) of the
country in which the foreign persons acquiring United States entities are based.
Id. § 2(g).
122. Kaplan, Foreign Ownership, supra note 12 (quoting Douglas Holtz-Eakin and
Todd Malan).
123. The law introduces a requirement that all transactions resulting in foreign control
of “critical infrastructure” as defined in the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, and is intended “to create a realistic standard by which
CFIUS should measure the potential impact on national security,” while allowing CFIUS
to promulgate regulations that “exclude from mandatory investigation commercial assets
that clearly do not by themselves constitute critical infrastructure.” The provisions exclude cases that are resolved through prior mitigation agreements. S. REP. NO. 109-264,
supra note 109, at 7; see also JOHN MOTEFF & PAUL PARFOMAK, CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY ASSETS: DEFINITION AND IDENTIFICATION, CRS RL 32631
(Oct. 1, 2004) (discussing evolution of the concept of critical infrastructure).
124. See generally Nowak, supra note 10 (analyzing the potential application of the
1992 amendments to Exon-Florio to dual-use technologies for protectionist ends, which
would result in the diversion of foreign investment from the United States to foreign
competitors, ultimately weakening the defense industrial base).
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tries as factors for consideration necessarily entails a shift from a primarily management control-based inquiry focused on issues of defense supply to a broader inquiry that creates a categorical presumption of risk
based on foreign ownership of property, including purely physical security. 125
Similar consequences follow from the introduction of mandatory consideration of individual country assessments. Under the bill, CFIUS must
consider individual country assessments when evaluating the risk of the
proposed transaction not only with respect to a foreign government, but
also with respect to an investment contemplated by a private citizen of
that nation. 126 Individual country assessments, to be issued following
enactment of the bill, encompass: (i) a country’s past adherence to nonproliferation control regimes; (ii) the country’s past relationship with the
United States, specifically the country’s record on cooperation with the
United States in counter-terrorism efforts; and (iii) the risk the country
presents with respect to transshipment and diversion of technologies,
especially those with military applications and entails analysis of the
country’s national export control laws and regulations. 127
As with the incorporation of the critical infrastructure and technologies
requirement, the country assessments dramatically expand the scope of
the current review. The elements encompassed in the country assessment
assign greater weight to historical factors in considering the risk of a potential investment than exist in the current paradigm. 128 Insofar as the
country assessment must be applied to private individuals as well as governments or persons acting on behalf of governments, the assessment
creates a categorical presumption of risk with respect to private invest-

125. See LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 29 (recommending Congress refrain from incorporating critical infrastructure into the review process, and noting that “[t]he administration and Congress should work together to determine how best to protect critical infrastructure, regardless of who owns a particular company”). CFIUS’ operative definition of control is provided in the regulations promulgated
under the existing law, and may or may not be retained if the bill is passed. The current
operational definition of control resides in 31 C.F.R. § 800.204.
126. S. 3549 § 2(g).
127. Id. § 2(c)(7).
128. In the current law, where a totality of the circumstances review is conducted, the
past conduct and future plans of the individual investor, and to a lesser extent, the investors country of origin, are considered but only insofar as they implicate national security
in light of the risk presented by the overall transaction, and thus, no categorical presumption against certain countries is created. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
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ment from those countries, based purely on the individual investor’s citizenship. 129
As with the existing statute, the proposed bill requires strict confidentiality, but enhances congressional oversight by introducing expansive reporting requirements. 130 These include notice to Congress upon initiation
and completion of the first-stage thirty-day review, and if the secondstage investigation is deemed necessary or required by the statute (as
with governments party to a transaction) upon initiation and conclusion
of the forty-five day second-stage investigation. 131 Both concluding notices require certification by the Chair and Vice Chair of CFIUS and include a report as to measures taken, factors considered, and ultimate decisions. 132 CFIUS must provide these notices to the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate, the ranking members of the Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and of any committees in the House
and Senate with oversight of an agency on CFIUS that is assigned to lead
review or investigation of the transaction. 133 The bill provides the Majority and Minority Leaders discretion to release these reports to other
members of Congress where the transaction concerned implicates critical
infrastructure in their home state. 134 The proposed bill also retains the
four-year reporting requirement of the existing bill, but incorporates this
as a subset of a new annual report. 135 Finally, where a proposed transaction concerns critical infrastructure, CFIUS must notify the governor of
the affected state. 136
129. The proposed bill by its terms requires that country assessments be considered for
all reviews and investigations, whether from a private citizen or government party. S.
3549 § 2(g).
130. Id. § 2 (h)(1).
131. Id. § 2 (j)(1) & (2) (providing requirements for notice and reports to Congress
keyed to the stages of the review process set forth in subsections (a) and (b)).
132. Id. § 2(j)(3).
133. Id. § 2(j)(3)(C).
134. Id. § 2(j)(3)(D).
135. The annual report is required to include a discussion of the potential impact on the
U.S. defense industrial base and critical infrastructure of foreign acquisitions during preceding year, and an aggregate analysis of the previous four years, prospective discussion
of risks to national security and critical infrastructure, evaluation of whether there is
credible evidence of a coordinated strategy by one or more countries or companies to
acquire critical infrastructure or companies involved in research development or production critical technologies, and whether there are industrial espionage activities directed by
foreign governments against private U.S. companies. Id. § 2(j)(4)(A)–(B); see also S.
REP. NO. 109-264, supra note 109, at 13–15.
136. S. 3549 § 2(h)(2). The governor notice requirement stemmed from concerns
voiced by state-level officials that they had no information regarding a pending transaction that could adversely affect their state, especially with respect to critical infrastruc-
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The bill further disciplines the process by implementing safeguards for
transactions that are notified to CFIUS. Withdrawal and resubmission of
a filing triggers a mandatory forty-five day investigation. 137 The bill also
requires CFIUS to monitor withdrawn transactions that nonetheless proceed and to initiate review if parties do not voluntarily re-file. 138 Where
CFIUS resolves national security risks through mitigation agreements, 139
the bill provides for ongoing oversight of such agreements by CFIUS, 140
underwritten by a grant of authority to the Attorney General to investigate and enforce the agreements in the District of Columbia. 141
The minimum threshold analysis introduced by the new bill shifts the
existing balance by subordinating the open investment principle to national security concerns. This shift is reflected in the presumptions the
bill creates regarding two categories of risks: those presented by ownership of infrastructures and technology deemed “critical” and those presented by the national origin of the proposed individual or country investment. 142
The benefit of this shift is that in clearly articulating sources of risks,
including long-term risks, the review process is more likely to ensure that
questionable transactions are investigated by CFIUS, reducing the likelihood that risky transactions will “slip through the cracks.” As noted
above, the definition of critical infrastructure is broad and encompasses
economic security criteria. 143 Consequently, the mandatory consideration
ture, with view to discussing potential security concerns, subject to the same confidentiality requirements that apply to the federal government. S. REP. NO. 109-264, supra note
109, at 12.
137. S. 3549 § 2(b)(3).
138. Id. § 2(b)(4).
139. Though such mitigation agreements resolve most investigations in approval, the
current review process does not address enforcement subsequent to approval. See S. REP.
NO. 109-264, supra note 109, at 13.
140. S. 3549 § 2(i)(4).
141. Remedies include injunctive relief, damages, and divestiture. Id. § 2(i)(5).
142. The existing statutory framework was criticized in 2002 on similar grounds because the broad discretion conferred by the statute could be interpreted as broadly as the
proposed bill. See generally Christopher R. Fenton, Note, U.S. Policy Toward Foreign
Direct Investment Post-September 11: Exon-Florio in the Age of Transnational Security,
41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 195 (2002) (noting that the existing statutory framework in
the new post-September 11 security context could be expanded to include consideration
of threats identified on the basis of individual and organizational relationships, rather
than investor nationality, as necessary to adequately address threats posed by non-state
actors, and thus will expand scope of review to encompass foreign control of domestic
industries, particularly those required for the anti-terror campaign).
143. “The term ‘critical infrastructure’ . . . includ[es] national economic security and
national public health or safety . . . .” S. 3549 § 2(m)(2).
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of critical infrastructure ensures that FDI that may entail long-term consequences for the United States through control of American assets,
whereby foreign owners may exert their influence in a fashion inimical
to American interests, for example by effectuating technology transfer or
transferring American jobs overseas, is thoroughly investigated. 144
In addition, requiring CFIUS to consider country assessments as part of
its review ensures that each transaction is placed in a broader geopolitical context. With respect to the DPW deal, for example, the security
risks presented by the UAE’s acquisition of a controlling interest would
be considered in light of factors like its proximity to Iran, the evidence
that Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan exploited Dubai’s relaxed
environment to smuggle nuclear components to Iran, Libya and North
Korea, and its role as a conduit for funding of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. 145 Furthermore, the inclusion of this factor in the review
process creates an incentive for private parties to encourage states, and
for states themselves, to establish a good track record of compliance with
U.S. foreign policy.
Similarly, the expanded reporting requirements promise to introduce
greater discipline in the process by ensuring Congress is informed about
deals at initiation and conclusion, making oversight more effective. 146 A
corollary benefit would be increased public and congressional confidence
that reviews are handled as required by law, minimizing the public controversy that follows when a transaction is criticized in popular press.
This, in turn, could prevent the public controversy that resulted in alienation of the investors in both the DPW and Smartmatic deals, and ultimately, divestment of their U.S. holdings. 147
By the same token, this approach may be criticized as over-inclusive.
The incorporation of mandatory consideration of transactions affecting
critical infrastructure 148 includes a diverse array of industry sectors. 149 As
144. See, e.g., GAO Mar. 1990, supra note 28, at 11, 25.
145. See S. REP. NO. 109-264, supra note 109, at 10–11.
146. Id. at 13.
147. See BBC NEWS, Q&A, supra note 60; NY TIMES, Voting Machine Maker for Sale,
supra note 75.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 5195(c) (“[S]ystems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital
to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health
or safety, or any combination of those matters.”).
149. The National Strategy for Homeland Security identifies the critical infrastructure
sectors as agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemical industry, postal, and shipping. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra
note 5, at 29–30. As the linchpin for all homeland defense legislation, see id. at 47–50.
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discussed above, this creates a categorical presumption that investment in
certain industries and physical assets presents a national security risk and
introduces overt economic security factors that have been rejected in the
past, in part because requiring consideration of transactions that were not
at the core of national security would limit executive discretion to respond to national security considerations while also deterring foreign
investment. 150 Worse, given the small membership of CFIUS, it risks
defusing its focus and diverting limited resources from transactions
CFIUS would otherwise prioritize. 151 This is especially true in light of
the fact that critical infrastructure encompasses at least twenty-five percent of the economy. 152 Moreover, the incorporation of country assessments risks alienating foreign governments because they may be deployed as an overarching policy tool, whereby foreign investment is conditioned upon establishing a record of cooperation with U.S. policy
goals. 153 Because “past CFIUS cases indicate it is inherently more difficult for a CFIUS agency to argue that foreign firms from allied countries

See generally MOTEFF & PARFOMAK, supra note 123 (helpful overview of evolution of
the definition of critical infrastructure).
150. See Holmer et al., supra note 105, 608, 615–17 (listing series of bills introduced
in the early 1990s that attempted to introduce economic security criteria but failed);
LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 28; Deborah M. Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio: A Threat To National Security or a
Tempest In a Seaport?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 583, 591–3, 622 (2007).
151. Byrne, supra note 108, at 905 (noting that inclusion of economic security in
CFIUS review would dilute the focus from “true threats” and allow its diversion to general economic protectionism with the added risk that foreign nations would emulate this
policy, jeopardizing U.S. foreign investments abroad).
152. LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 29.
153. See Wysocki, Jr. et al., supra note 14. Unlike the Senate bill, the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty rejects nationality as a proxy for any purpose. Article 9(1) states
“[n]either Party may require that an enterprise of that Party that is a covered investment
appoint to senior management positions natural persons of any particular nationality.”
Article 9(2) allows a party to require a majority of a managing board of directors “be of a
particular nationality or resident in a particular territory, provided that the requirement
does not materially impair the ability of the investor to exercise control over its investment.” U.S. Department of State, U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2004),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf. One scholar has suggested that
the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties, despite the failure of the international
community in the aggregate to attain consensus on general principles governing foreign
investment, is evidence of legal obligations undertaken by states has resulted in “something like customary law.” Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 150 (2003).
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may threaten national security” this is particularly problematic as a criteria for FDI risk assessment. 154
In expanding CFIUS’ scope through inclusion of critical infrastructure
and country assessments as factors, the bill broadens the sweep of CFIUS
review and investigation, effectively expanding its operational definition
of “national security” but without articulating any clear guidance to investors. 155 In this way, the bill unnecessarily risks alienating foreign investors and governments because differing views of national security are
already accounted for in CFIUS membership. 156 By decreasing CFIUS’
discretion and increasing the number of factors for consideration, the bill
implicates an underlying concern that the operational definition of national security currently employed by CFIUS is too narrow. 157 Broadly
defined, “national security” may encompass concerns about the growth
and direction of the U.S. economy at large, consequences for the U.S.
economy where foreign capital may be from a country vulnerable to social or political crises and general commercial competitiveness from
risks presented by technology transfer. 158 Since different views of national security are currently taken into account in the diverse CFIUS
membership, 159 where such views are materially different, their consid154. GAO Feb. 1991, supra note 95, at 8. This trend is also reflected in the larger pattern of foreign investment discussed above, which noted that the predominant source of
FDI in the United States is countries typically allied with the United States. Alienating
investments from countries that are less clearly allied runs counter to the principle of
open investment whereby aligning economic interests contributes to overall stability, and
consequently to the maintenance of national security. See discussion supra Part II.
155. An article discussing the 1991 regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department noted that the regulations failed to define national security with any specificity,
despite complaints from investors and multi-national corporations that had lobbied for a
bright line test because the regulations provided inadequate guidance. See Holmer et al.,
supra note 105, at 595, 608–10.
156. The debate regarding the definition of “national security” in Exon-Florio has
plagued the review process since its inception. See id. In 1990, a GAO report concluded
that “the absence of a specific definition of national security” had not negatively impacted CFIUS investigations. GAO Mar. 1990, supra note 28, at 11. In 2003, CFIUS was
expanded to include the DHS, which conducts reviews of critical infrastructure to identify and handle threats. See Exec. Order No. 13,286, 68 F.R. 10,619 (Feb. 28, 2003).
157. At present, the term “national security” is undefined. In practice, the scope of the
review process provides an operational definition. A narrow definition concerns primarily
firms whose business derives from defense contracts. A broader definition encompasses
firms engaged in non-defense commercial business. See GAO Mar. 1990, supra note 28,
at 11.
158. See, e.g., GAO May 1990, supra note 11, at 3.
159. By requiring CFIUS to examine security risks in terms of aggregate effects over
long-term, and thus limiting foreign investment could “translate into inferiority in the
development, prototyping, manufacturing and production and product improvement
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eration is ensured by the CFIUS practice of proceeding by consensus. 160
This means the dissenting vote of any one member automatically triggers
the second-stage review, whereupon the dissenting vote must be brought
to the attention of the President as part of the final determination whether
to exercise his or her authority to block a deal. 161
In addition to expanding the operative definition of national security,
the bill also expands reporting requirements, but fails to provide clear
guidelines for confidentiality and disclosure on the part of Congress,
risking politicization of a review process that had previously been safely
sequestered from Congress. 162 This in turn, combined with the requirement to notify and consult with state governors regarding investment in
their state’s critical infrastructure, 163 which by definition includes economic security criteria, introduces a strong likelihood that the review
process will be exploited for protectionist ends. 164
Finally, the combination of increased oversight and stricter enforcement of national security mitigation agreements could entail inappropriate involvement in the business decisions of companies. 165 Especially in
conjunction with other aspects of the bill, the provisions governing mitigation agreements introduce a risk of protectionism, whereby CFIUS
could become a vehicle for the imposition of performance requirements
on foreign acquisitions by U.S. companies. 166 Because these mitigation
agreements have the full force of law and are subject to investigation and
enforcement, the bill may be a further deterrent to foreign investors faced
with internalizing the cost of broad U.S. policy concerns regarding national security. 167
strategies . . . .” Bobrow & Kudrle, supra note 11, at 74–5; see also Nowak, supra note
10.
160. Byrne, supra note 108, at 909.
161. Id.
162. See LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 15–17.
163. S. 3549 § 2(h)(2).
164. See LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 29. The existing review process has itself been criticized as a vehicle for domestic protectionism. See
generally Shearer, supra note 42. The litigation brought by the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey and the Miami-based stevedoring company cited contractual claims
and concerns over security in their suits to block the deal. Concerns regarding layoffs,
etc. may have been an underlying motivation for the suit. See, e.g., WALL ST. J. ONLINE,
Ports Deal News Tracker, supra note 53.
165. GAO Sept. 2002, supra note 102, at 24, 27.
166. Id. at 28.
167. A corporation’s primary duty is to its shareholders; placing the burden of mitigating security issues with respect to critical infrastructure that encompasses bridges and flu
vaccinations places too much burden on private capital. See J. Michael Littlejohn, Using
all the Kings Horses for Homeland Security: Implementing the Defense Production Act
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C. Does the Senate Bill Enhance National Security?
On balance, the new bill shifts the existing paradigm, at minimum, by
bringing the national security principle on par with, if not elevating it
over, the open investment principle. In contrast, in the existing paradigm,
the national security principle is often subordinate to the open investment
principle, while allowing discretion as needed. This paradigm shift finds
symbolic and substantive manifestation in the appointment of the Secretary of Defense as the Vice-Chair for CFIUS. 168 Because the bill risks
that American businesses may have greater difficulty courting foreign
investors, with the consequence that over time, flows of FDI could be
reduced, the question becomes whether the Senate bill accomplishes this
result with appreciable benefits for national security. The application of
the two different paradigms to the DWP and Smartmatic deals helps illustrate the different schema in action.
With respect to the DPW transaction, the principle concerns were that
CFIUS failed to subject the transaction to the second-stage forty-five day
review required by existing law, and that even if it had, CFIUS failed to
properly consider the larger geo-political context of the deal, especially
as related to national security risks to ports within the United States. 169
Under the new paradigm, the corporate entity owned by the UAE would
be required to notify CFIUS of the deal, and under the expanded reporting requirements, Congress would also be notified, allowing it to ensure
that the second-stage forty-five day investigation was conducted as required by both the new bill and existing law. 170 However, the mitigation
agreement negotiations that occurred during the first-stage review of the
DPW acquisition would probably not have been materially different, although the negotiations may have been accomplished without the furor
that surrounded the transaction and perhaps avoiding the related public
pressure that eventually scuttled the U.S. portions of the deal. 171
for Disaster Relief and Critical Infrastructure Protection, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 2 (2006)
(observing the important role of the private sector, the negative publicity where risks to
infrastructure are identified, how this may operate as a disincentive to effective collaboration with the private sector, and identifying the legal framework for government authority
to compel cooperation from the private sector in the event of natural disaster or terrorist
attack).
168. S. 3549 § 2(c)(3); Byrne, supra note 108, 909 (arguing that maintaining the Department of Treasury as chair ensures primacy of open investment policy while allowing
agencies with different mandates adequate authority to ensure that national security concerns are addressed; changing the chairmanship risks upsetting this balance without real
national security benefit).
169. See Hufbauer, supra note 52; Kaplan, UAE Purchase, supra note 3.
170. S. 3549 § 2(j)(1)–(2).
171. BBC NEWS, supra note 60.
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It is unclear how CFIUS’ consideration of the mandatory country assessments in evaluating the risks presented by the transaction would affect the review; it is possible that the UAE’s track record as a conduit for
arms and money to terrorists and rogue states would force CFIUS to recommend blocking the deal at the conclusion of the second-stage investigation. 172 Because it is unlikely that the national security mitigation
agreements would have been materially different, it is not clear that any
appreciable security benefit would be attained by the more disciplined
minimum threshold paradigm reflected in the bill. At minimum, the issue
would be brought to the President, including any dissenting views, and
on the facts of this case, the deal would probably have been allowed to
proceed. 173 In this case, as the President noted defending his approval of
the transaction, 174 the factual misconception that was the kernel of the
controversy is two-fold: the nature of the property interest in the ports
(here merely leases), and the security responsibilities entailed by that
interest. 175 For example, it is common place in the United States for foreign corporations to own and operate U.S. ports. 176 Port security remains
a primary responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection supervises security for cargo, and U.S. citizens
staff most ports. 177 Consequently, risks relating to ports as a conduit for
foreign personnel and cargo, including terrorists or bombs, remain under
the purview of the U.S. government irrespective of who manages vessels
and ports. 178 Thus, the security risks specifically implicated by the transaction were likely mitigated by the agreement, and those that were not
were well beyond the power of DPW to mitigate. 179 The principle concerns raised by critics were symptomatic of larger concerns regarding
U.S. vulnerability in ports at large and not specific to DPW. Regardless
172. S. 3549 § 2 (c)(7) (mandatory country assessments).
173. 31 C.F.R. § 800.504 (regulation requiring presentation of dissenting views to
President).
174. Major Garrett et al., Bush Says He Will Veto Any Bill to Stop UAE Port Deal, FOX
NEWS, Feb. 22, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,185479,00.html (describing
Bush Administration’s defense of President’s approval of the DPW transaction).
175. JOHN FRITTELLI, TERMINAL OPERATORS AND THEIR ROLE IN U.S. PORT AND
MARITIME SECURITY, CRS RL33383 (Apr. 20, 2006) (providing a comprehensive overview of the operation and security of U.S. ports).
176. State-owned Singaporean shipping company, Neptune Orient Lines, operates U.S.
ports. Kaplan, UAE Purchase, supra note 3.
177. See generally FRITTELLI, supra note 175; see also Kaplan, UAE Purchase, supra
note 3.
178. Kaplan, UAE Purchase, supra note 3.
179. Bilkey, Testimony, supra note 56, 59 and accompanying text (itemizing concessions, including, of specific relevance here, the provision of personnel files to DHS).
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of the outcome of this particular transaction, the security vulnerability of
U.S. ports remains. 180
The consequences for the Smartmatic deal are slightly different. The
Smartmatic deal concerned the acquisition of a relatively small, privately
held concern, Sequoia Voting Systems, based in Oakland, California,
which, as discussed, never underwent CFIUS review. 181 The principle
concern with the Smartmatic deal was that the transaction implicated the
government of Venezuela and that electronic voting systems are too central to U.S. national interests and too vulnerable to tampering. 182 Whether
the new minimum threshold paradigm proposed by the Senate would be
more likely to bring the Smartmatic deal under review by CFIUS depends on a few different factors. If the Venezuelan government had an
interest in the transaction, either itself or a person acting on its behalf, the
parties to the deal would be required to file with CFIUS (under both
paradigms). 183 However, because the deal involved neither the government of Venezuela, nor a person acting on behalf of Venezuela, it is not
clear that this acquisition would have been brought to the attention of
CFIUS. 184 Two principle possibilities remain. Given the expansive definition of critical infrastructure, whether the transaction would be submitted for review under the new paradigm depends on whether voting systems would be considered critical infrastructure. 185 The second possibility under the new paradigm is if the Secretary of Defense determined
Venezuela constituted a regional threat. 186 If the deal were notified to
CFIUS through either mechanism, under the new paradigm, Congress
would have been alerted to the occurrence of the transaction.
In contrast, under the existing paradigm, CFIUS would neither be required to nor precluded from consideration of this transaction. In addition, under the existing law, if the transaction were notified to CFIUS,
both the Department of Defense or the DHS (both currently represented
on CFIUS) could review the transaction and conclude that foreign ownership of a voting systems manufacturer constituted a potential impairment of national security. In this case, any security concerns could be
addressed through mitigation agreements, without the need to subject the
180. As reflected in the enactment of broad port security legislation following the
DPW controversy. See discussion infra notes 208–209 and accompanying text.
181. See discussion, supra Part III.B.
182. See SVS Oct. 29, 2006 Press Release, supra note 73; GAO Elections, 2007, supra
note 78.
183. S. 3549 § 2(b)(5) (mandatory notice requirements for foreign governments); see
supra note 93.
184. See Golden, supra note 1.
185. S. 3549 § 2(g)(1).
186. Id. § 2(g)(6)(B).
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transaction to the enhanced scrutiny required by the additional factors in
the Senate bill. Under both the existing law and the proposed law, the
larger policy concern regarding the vulnerability of electronic voting systems, like the larger problem with ports following the scuttled DPW deal,
remains.
Thus, the new paradigm may have some impact in increasing the number of investigations notified to CFIUS for review, but without appreciably enhancing national security, and potentially at significant long-term
cost.
V. RESOLVING THE EXON-FLORIO PROBLEM
As illustrated above, the existing paradigm strikes a preferable balance
between open investment and national security, and preserves the substance of the principle underlying open investment, which maintains that
aligning economic interests in the long term provides greater stability,
and ultimately, security. 187 Despite its preferable balance of open investment and national security values, the analysis above reveals several
critical and interrelated problems in the current review and investigation
process: 1) CFIUS does not necessarily follow the review process mandated by law; 188 2) CFIUS failure to keep Congress abreast of its review
process may create a volatile mix of congressional and public lack of
confidence that results in divestment despite lack of any credible evidence of a threat to national security; 189 and 3) CFIUS failure to inform
Congress may also result in an inappropriate focus on security risks created by a specific transaction, diverting focus from the larger security
issue of which the transaction is but a part. 190
While the proposed bill seeks to address these concerns, it does so at
great cost by creating categorical presumptions as to who and what present national security concerns at risk of alienating foreign investments
and governments, which could redound to the detriment of the American
economy in the long run. 191 Deterring investment in U.S. companies
means capital will flow elsewhere and alienates private and government
parties with whom the United States would gain the most by cooperat187. See Kaplan, Foreign Ownership, supra note 11.
188. See Mostaghel, supra note 150, at 620 (CFIUS failed to conduct the forty-five day
investigation of the DPW transaction as required by the existing law).
189. See id. at 622 (describing the partisan melee on Capital Hill over the DPW deal).
190. See Byrne, supra note 108, at 902–05.
191. “There are those who would broaden Exon-Florio to include threats to national
objectives such as industrial competitiveness, but that sort of inclusiveness would basically cover exactly those nations with whom technological cooperation has the most to
offer for U.S. objectives.” Bobrow & Kudrle, supra note 11, at 90.
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ing. 192 On the other hand, failing to address the problems implicated by
lack of congressional and public confidence in the CFIUS review process
may implicate similar long-term costs by subjecting specific transactions
to unwarranted and partisan scrutiny. 193
Alienation of private sector and government foreign interests presents
very real costs. 194 For example, concessions regarding access to employment records in the final stages of the DPW deal represents a missed
opportunity to obtain inside information about global shipping, and as a
result, for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to gain insight into
global smuggling of terrorists and weapons. 195 Furthermore, encouraging
the deal would have helped ensure DPW instituted practices compliant
with U.S. security standards in U.S. ports as well as abroad, notably the
port in Dubai. 196 Similarly, enlisting the cooperation of Smartmatic in
developing electronic voting systems standards and in ensuring that
Smartmatic units meet these standard would likely result in the diffusion
of these standards to elections in Venezuela, if for no other reason than
economies of scale. 197
192. Nowak, supra note 10, at 1030–31.
193. In the controversy following the DPW deal, it was observed that congressional
case-by-case review of commercial transactions at large would generate untenable uncertainties and potential delays for foreign investors with a chilling effect, but this is equally
true whether the scrutiny is de jure or de facto. See C. Fred Bergsten, Op-Ed., Avoiding
Another Dubai, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2006, available at http://www.iie.com/
publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=603; see also Bush Threatens Veto in Ports
Row, BBC NEWS, Feb. 22, 2006, http://news.bb.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/
4737940.stm.
194. The private sector and foreign governments are identified as critical partners in
the National Strategy for Homeland Security. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 5, at
33–35.
195. Block, supra note 56.
196. DPW, with the $6.8 billion purchase of P&O, became the third largest port operator in the world. Kaplan, UAE Purchase, supra note 3; see also LARSON & MARCHICK,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 20; King, Jr., supra note 59. The significance of
DPW’s willingness to assume responsibility for purchasing, deploying and maintaining
radiation detection systems cannot be underestimated. At this stage, although there are
serious questions as to the efficacy and value of next-generation systems, DHS figures
estimate an increase of over $320,000 per unit to up-grade existing security, a process
that would not be complete at all U.S. ports until 2013. A recent report indicated these
costs could be well below actual cost. GAO, COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING: DHS’S
DECISION TO PROCURE AND DEPLOY THE NEXT GENERATION OF RADIATION DETECTION
EQUIPMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ITS COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, GAO-07-581T, Mar. 14,
2007 (Testimony of Gene Aloise).
197. For example, the results of the widely criticized 2004 election in Venezuela were
eventually audited. The Carter Center participated in the audit and attested that the
Smartmatic voting machines operated “flawlessly.” Juan Forero, Opposition Rejects Au-
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Alienating the government of UAE would have further concrete costs.
The Dubai government runs the Middle East’s biggest airline, Emirates
Air, just one of a several UAE government-owned companies with substantial investments worldwide, including in the United States. 198 Despite
its mixed record supporting U.S. foreign policy, the UAE gave $100 million to assist victims of Hurricane Katrina. 199 In addition, in a “symbol
that the United States trusted the UAE and took the UAE seriously,” the
UAE government was permitted to purchase 80 F-16 fighter jets in a
$6.4 billion deal in 2000. 200 Following criticism that funds funneled
through its hub financed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
UAE bolstered its anti-money laundering and terror-financing laws and
generally increased oversight. 201 The UAE was also the first country to
implement the U.S. Cargo Security initiative to pre-screen containers at
foreign ports and hosts five U.S. Customs Officials. 202 Finally, the Jebel
Ali Port is an important global host to the U.S. Navy, more so than any
other foreign port. 203 The DPW acquisition was part of the UAE’s overall
plan to develop a stable, international financial center based in Dubai,
transforming oil wealth into longer term investments, diversifying the
economy and increasing the region’s integration into the global economy. 204
Instead of burdening the influx of much-needed foreign capital with
broad-based U.S. security concerns, the central problems of the Smartmatic and DPW deals should be addressed. Namely, reform should seek
to increase congressional confidence that a thorough review has been
conducted, 205 while providing a mechanism to identify and address larger
security vulnerabilities that may be exposed in the CFIUS review process. As the GAO noted, “[t]hese questions need to be addressed at a
higher policy-making level and in a broader context than the case-by-

dit Plan in Venezuela Recall Vote Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, at A5. On the
emerging controversy, see Juan Forero & John Schwartz, Venezuelan Recall Is In Dispute
Even Before the Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at A3; Brian Ellsworth, A Crucial Vote
for Venezuela and a Company, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at W1.
198. Spindle et al., supra note 3 (these companies purchased major historic hotels and
landmarks in New York, San Francisco, and London).
199. Joel Brinkley and Craig S. Smith, Storm and Crisis: Foreign Aid; Offers Pour In,
But the U.S. Is Unprepared, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at A25.
200. Spindle et al., supra note 3.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Spindle & El-Rashidi, supra note 27.
205. See LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 25–26.
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case approach presently afforded by CFIUS.” 206 What is striking about
the DPW and Smartmatic controversies is that while both represented
lost opportunities for the United States to collaborate with the private
sector to implement national security policy on a global scale, 207 one
positive parallel development was the drafting of legislation to address
the larger security concerns implicated in the transactions. In 2006, Congress enacted laws to address the unique security concerns raised in
ports. 208 In the following year, bills were introduced to Congress to secure electronic voting systems, but as of the time of publication, none has
yet passed. 209 The costs of these security concerns should not be assessed
on each individual transaction, but by legislation to address the larger
vulnerability that may emerge from the inquiry. The value of congressional oversight in this context is not only to ensure that CFIUS appropriately implements presidential authority to review transactions, 210 but
more importantly to provide oversight on the second prong of the ExonFlorio test: where existing laws provide the President insufficient authority to protect national security. 211 As illustrated by the Smartmatic and
DPW deals, the goal of congressional oversight should be to focus attention on specific security vulnerabilities that may not be adequately addressed through mitigation agreements in recognition of the fact that the
identifiable risks that emerge from a particular transaction are in many
cases only a small part of a given vulnerability.
To the extent that greater congressional oversight is required or desirable, it should be strictly circumscribed to avoid the partisan melee that
ultimately alienated the investors in the DPW and Smartmatic deals. As
one author notes, although “Congress has a role in forming U.S. foreign
and national security policy, . . . its role is more appropriately a secondary one of oversight and review.” 212 While the proposed bill purports to
206. GAO Feb. 1991, supra note 95, at 10.
207. See Stephen Flynn & Daniel B. Prieto, Op-Ed., Capitalizing on the Private Sector
to Protect the Homeland, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2006.
208. Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347
(codified in scattered sections of 9 U.S.C and 46 U.S.C.).
209. Vote Integrity and Verification Act of 2007, S. 559, 110th Cong. (2007); Voter
Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007, H.R. 811, 110th Cong. (2007).
210. Cf. Mostaghel, supra note 150, at 620–22 (rejecting any change to the existing
law and suggesting CFIUS do a better job following it).
211. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e).
212. Russell J. Bruemmer, Intelligence Community Reorganization: Declining the
Invitation to Struggle, 101 YALE L.J. 867, 880 (1992). As Bruemmer notes, where national security and foreign relations are concerned, the executive powers are at their constitutional apex. In fact, the executive branch will have the best and most accurate information both about the geo-political context of a particular transaction and the degree to
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maintain confidentiality, its notice and reporting mechanisms are sure to
embroil transactions in partisan domestic politics, introducing a substantial risk to the transactions concerned. 213 Furthermore, the bill provides
no specific measures for ensuring confidentiality, while injecting sensitive national security information and proprietary corporate information
into the partisan and political arena of Congress. 214
At most, the annual reports proposed in the new bill should permit sufficient oversight to ensure that Congress is confident CFIUS conducts a
thorough review and to alert Congress to the larger security issues that
emerge out of a particular transaction; any expanded notice and reporting
requirements should be rejected. 215 In the event that further scrutiny
demonstrates a need for enhanced oversight, a committee modeled after
the Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence provide may a viable solution. 216
The Select Committee emerged relatively recently, in 1976, at around
the same time a committee to review FDI was first considered. 217 The
interests at stake are similar; the oversight responsibilities implicate national security and core executive branch activity, with a strong need for
confidentiality. To implement its oversight responsibilities, the Senate
created an oversight committee with limited membership, strict voting
procedures and rules governing confidentiality of information, and imposed consequences for failure to comply. More specifically, membership in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is cooperative
through appointment by the President based on recommendations of the
Senate leadership; membership must represent members from both political parties. 218 Any disclosure of confidential information by the Committee requires first, that the Committee vote, and if a majority agrees
that disclosure is in the public interest, the Committee must notify the
President, who may object that the threat to the national interest posed by
such disclosure outweighs the public interest in that confidential information, whereupon the Committee may vote to refer to the question of
which it presents a threat to national security; the President is also the party on whom
failure will be most prominently visited. Id. at 878–80 (analyzing the roles of the executive and legislative branches with respect to intelligence community reform).
213. The mandatory notification to state governors, S. 3549 § 2(h)(2), and case-by-case
notice to Congress, id. § 2(j).
214. See id. § 2(h)(1) (information filed with CFIUS shall be exempt from disclosure,
but instituting no mechanisms or penalties).
215. LARSON & MARCHICK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 29.
216. On reporting requirements introduced in the new bill, see id. § 2(j).
217. S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976) (establishing the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence); see also Breummer, supra note 212, at 873–4.
218. S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. app. A, § 2(a)(1) & (a)(2) (1976).
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disclosure of such information to the Senate at large in closed session. 219
Aside from this procedure for disclosure, all other information is confidential, and any individual that discloses information in violation of
these procedures may be subject to censure, including removal from office. 220 In so doing, the regulations address the need for oversight while
remaining cognizant of the importance of confidentiality and the vulnerability of congressional oversight to inappropriate politicization. As applied to CFIUS, a similar model would provide specific measures to ensure that congressional oversight is employed only to ensure the law is
followed and where executive review reveals inadequacy in presidential
authority to address national security exigencies. Limiting the purview of
oversight in this way, combined with the introduction of strict procedural
requirements to ensure that any such committee is bipartisan and the enforcement of confidentiality with concrete penalties limits the risk of
politicization of particular transactions and the disclosure of confidential
information (whether related to national security or to the interests of the
parties to the transaction), while achieving the objective of oversight:
that Congress receives timely notice of larger security risks where the
President’s authority is inadequate. This, in turn, would ensure the primacy of traditional principles of U.S. open investment policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The DPW deal precipitated a controversy that resulted in renewed
scrutiny of the role of FDI in the United States. The legislative reform of
the CFIUS review process proposed in the wake of this controversy
represents a dramatic shift in traditionally open U.S. investment policy.
In particular, the minimum threshold paradigm for FDI review introduced by the new bill limits CFIUS discretion with respect to the interpretation of who and what represent national security risks, without tangible security benefit. At the same time, the new bill sends a hostile message, a shot across the bow, to foreign investors. The DPW and Smartmatic transactions and their subsequent divestiture represent a paradigmatic failure to advance U.S. strategic interests on a global scale through
partnership with corporations operating worldwide. Furthermore, the
proposed bill risks that individual transactions will be burdened with
broader national security concerns. To maintain the primacy of U.S. open
investment policy, it may be necessary to expand congressional oversight
to restore congressional and public confidence in the post-September 11
era of heightened security concern. To the extent such oversight is neces219. Id. § 8(a) & (b).
220. Id. § 8(c)–(e).

1196

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 32:3

sary, it should be strictly circumscribed. In this context, oversight is required to ensure that CFIUS applies the existing law appropriately and to
ensure Congress may respond with legislation specific to any larger security vulnerability revealed in the review process. Furthermore, any expansion of congressional review should include confidentiality requirements enforced by strict procedures and penalties that resemble the procedures of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
VII. EPILOGUE
As this Note was prepared for publication, the Foreign Investment and
National Security Act of 2007 was signed into law by President Bush. 221
While a complete review of the new law is beyond the scope of the Note
at this late date, some preliminary observations are in order.
The new law reflects many of the characteristics of the minimum
threshold paradigm proposed in the bill analyzed in this Note. In particular, the new law changes CFIUS membership, expands CFIUS’ scope of
review while reducing its discretion, and substantially increases congressional oversight.
Under the new law, the most notable new CFIUS members are the Secretary of Labor and the Director of National Intelligence. 222 In addition,
unlike the bill analyzed above, which threatened to subordinate the open
investment principle to that of national security by designating the Secretary of Defense as Vice Chairperson of CFIUS, 223 the new law retains the
Secretary of the Treasury as the sole chairperson of CFIUS. 224 The addition of the Secretary of Labor remains troubling, however, in that it may
signal a shift from a narrow national security focus to one that may also
entail broader national security concerns like the preservation of domestic jobs. 225
As in the minimum threshold paradigm analyzed above, the new law
creates a presumption that foreign control of critical infrastructure creates a national security risk. 226 In the new law, when an investment by a
foreign entity could result in control of critical infrastructure and any
security risks remain unmitigated, a second-stage, forty-five day investi221. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, PL 110-49 (HR 556), 121
Stat. 246 (2007) (to be codified in 50 U.S.C. app § 2170). The new law establishes
CFIUS, which was formed by delegation of authority via executive order, by statute. Id. §
3(k)(1).
222. Both are nonvoting, ex officio members. Id. § 3(k)(2)(H) & (k)(2)(I).
223. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
224. Id. § 3(k)(3).
225. Id. § 3(k)(2)(H).
226. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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gation is required. 227 In addition, critical infrastructure is incorporated
into the law’s definition of national security and into the list of factors
for consideration by CFIUS, expanding the scope of CFIUS review at
least as much as the minimum threshold paradigm. 228 In marked contrast
to the minimum threshold paradigm, however, the potentially unlimited
sweep of this expansion is ameliorated by the requirement that the Secretary of the Treasury shall publish “guidance on the types of transactions
that the Committee has reviewed and that have presented national security considerations . . . .” 229
The new law also expands the scope of CFIUS review to include
evaluation of the country of origin’s track record of compliance with
non-proliferation regimes and its “relationship” with the United States. 230
These factors are the same factors that the bill analyzed in the body of
this Note characterized as “Assessments of Foreign Countries.” 231 The
new law limits consideration of these additional factors for review to
those investments by or on behalf of a foreign government. 232 Thus, on
its face and in contrast to the minimum threshold paradigm discussed
above, this expansion of CFIUS’ scope of review does not by its terms
require CFIUS to consider this evidence when evaluating the security
risk posed by a non-government affiliated private foreign investor. 233 On
the other hand, the new law requires any mitigation agreement be “based
on a risk-based analysis, conducted by the Committee, of the threat to
national security of the covered transaction.” 234 “Risk-based analysis” is
not a defined term; however, the new law’s definition of national security
incorporates “issues relating to ‘homeland security.’” 235 The combination
of these elements in the new law, like in the minimum threshold paradigm analyzed in the body of this Note, present a risk that individual
227. 121 Stat. 246 § 2 (b)(2)(B)(i)(III). On the timing requirements for investigations,
see id. § 2 (b)(2)(C).
228. “The term ‘national security’ shall be construed so as to include those issues relating to ‘homeland security’, including its application to critical infrastructure.” Id. §
2(a)(5). Critical infrastructure is also incorporated into the factors for CFIUS consideration. Id. § 4 (f)(4). The inclusion of a definition of “national security” for the purposes of
CFIUS review is itself a significant change. See supra note 120.
229. 121 Stat. 246 § 2 (b)(2)(E).
230. Id. § 4(4).
231. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
232. In the chapeau to the subsection, 121 Stat. 246 § 4(4), the new law states “as appropriate, and particularly with respect to transactions requiring an investigation under
subsection (b)(1)(B),” i.e. those instances where CFIUS “determines that the covered
transaction is a foreign government-controlled transaction . . . .” Id. § 2(b)(1)(B).
233. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
234. 121 Stat. 246 § 5(l)(1)(B).
235. Id. § 2(a)(5)
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transactions, whether they involve government or private foreign investors, may be required to internalize the costs of broad homeland security
issues in order to secure CFIUS approval. 236
The lack of tracking for drop-outs from the review process and lack of
enforcement authority for mitigation agreements noted as problems in
the law prior to amendment 237 have also been addressed in the new
law. 238 While these were addressed in the unadopted bill analyzed above,
the new law strikes a better balance by allowing CFIUS to promulgate its
own methods for evaluating compliance and by ensuring that compliance
with any mitigation agreements will not place “unnecessary burdens on a
party to a covered transaction.” 239
Finally, like the minimum threshold paradigm, the new law expands
congressional oversight of CFIUS’ reviews and investigations. 240 The
new law requires case-by-case notice to Congress. 241 However, unlike
the minimum threshold paradigm, the new law does not require notice at
the initiation of reviews and investigation, and instead, limits these notices to certifications at the completion of the first-stage review and second-stage investigation. 242 In addition, unlike the minimum threshold
paradigm, the new law does not require CFIUS to notify the governor
when a transaction involves critical infrastructure in that governor’s
state. 243 The new law, like the bill analyzed above, also modifies the current law’s quadrennial report requirement to include an annual report. 244
By limiting notices to Congress to the concluding stage of the review and
investigation and by removing the requirement to notify state governors,
the new law strikes a better balance than the bill analyzed above by
achieving increased public and congressional confidence in the thoroughness of review while limiting the potential for the damaging consequences of unnecessary publicity and politicization. 245
In conclusion, the new law bears a striking resemblance to the minimum threshold paradigm introduced by the bill analyzed in the body of
this Note. The new law contains some important differences however,
and as a consequence, it strikes a better balance between national security and the principle of open investment. In particular, the provisions
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See discussion supra Part V.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
121 Stat. 246 § 5(l)(1)–(3).
Id. § 5(l)(3)(B)(ii) & (l)(3)(B)(ii)(II).
Id. § 2(b)(3) (certifications to Congress) & § 7 (increased oversight by Congress).
Id. § 2(b)(3).
Id.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
121 Stat. 246 § 7(b).
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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that require the Secretary of the Treasury to provide guidance to investors regarding which transactions typically raise national security considerations may allay the concerns of many foreign investors. On the other
hand, the incorporation of homeland defense issues and critical infrastructure into the definition of national security risks burdening individual transactions with the costs of larger U.S. security vulnerability that
should be addressed through national security legislation like the ports
security act discussed above. Whether the increased oversight by Congress provided in the new law will be sufficient to restore public and
congressional confidence while adequately circumscribing congressional
involvement so as to avoid a repeat performance of the damaging controversies that resulted in the unnecessary divestment of U.S. interests in
both the DPW and Smartmatic transactions remains to be seen.
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